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UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION AS AN
EVOLVING CONCEPT-PRELUDE
TO CONSUMERISM
EvErarrE MAcINTYRE
THEODOR P. VON BRAND**
I well remember my first session as a member of the Federal
Trade Commission. This occurred in the early part of 1920. The
chairman gave the newcomer a few kindly words of welcome. Then
he beamed with the anticipatory gusto of a child before a well-
stocked Christmas tree. Eagerly he asked me, "What do you think
unfair competition means?" I had never seen the animal, either
roaming its native wilds or in a state of captivity. And beyond the
bromidic statement that whatever was unlawful would seem to me
to be unfair, I had nothing to offer constructively. My impression
that the question was open to discussion was quickly confirmed.1
CONSUMER PROTECTION AND ITS ANTITRUST ANTECEDENTS
Government and public interest in problems of consumer protec-
tion has intensified. Congressmen, administrators and presidents alike
have issued statements exhibiting their dedication to the concept of
consumerism. Moreover, the 89th and 90th Congresses enacted some
20 bills devoted to improving the lot of the consumer,2 perhaps the
most concrete manifestation of the phenomenon of consumerism,
which gained strength and rose to a peak in the middle and late 1960's.
Nevertheless, despite its revolutionary growth in the recent past, the
roots of this development go deep, springing from many sources. It is
the purpose of this article to explore the Federal Trade Commission's
(FTC) contribution to consumer protection through the definition of
"unfair methods of competition" under the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act.3
Both the creation of the FTC and the passage of the FTCA (with
its broad ban on "unfair methods of competition") must be viewed in
a political context, i.e., in light of the three-way presidential race of
*Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission. A.B., University of North Carolina,
Chapel Hill, N.C., 1926; LL.B., The George Washington University, 1929.
** Attorney, Federal Trade Commission. A.B., Brown University, 1950; LL.B., The
George Washington University, 1954.
1 N. GASKILL, THE REGULATION OF CoMPETITION 4-5 (1986). Afr. Gaskill was a member of
the Federal Trade Commission in the period 1920-1925.
2 See ECONomic REPORT OF THE PRESDENrT ToGEmm xrn THE ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE COUNCIL OF ECONOMIC AnvisEs 110 (1969).
3 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. (1964), formerly 38 Stat. 717 (1914). The Federal Trade
Commission Act is referred to throughout this note as the FTCA or Act.
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1912.4 Woodrow Wilson's campaign speeches of that year, focusing on
the trust issue (the fundamental question distinguishing him from his
chief rival, Theodore Roosevelt), 5 had an extraordinary impact upon
the future of the Commission. The primary political question at that
time was whether monopoly should be regulated. Wilson opposed such
interference, warning that the Government would soon be dominated
by the very trust subjected to regulation. 6 Instead, Wilson reaffirmed
the validity of the competitive concept, denying the contention that
monopoly develops "through the natural development of business
conditions." 7 Similarly, he vigorously argued that it was illicit - not
free or fair - competition which tends to create monopolistic condi-
tions.8 This was the basic assumption leading to the enactment of the
FTCA, and it was Wilson's prescription of freedom of opportunity in
the context of fair competition which was to set the theme of the Com-
mission's subsequent activities. 9
An equally critical factor motivating passage of the FTCA was
public disenchantment with judicial interpretation of the Sherman
Act. 10 It led to the organization of the Commission as an administrative
agency, whose functions would parallel, to an important extent, the
enforcement activities of the Department of Justice. Congressional
concern had reached a peak in 1911 as a result of the Supreme Court's
decisions in Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States", and
American Tobacco Co. v. United States,12 in which the rule of reason
was applied to the Sherman Act's prohibition of agreements or com-
binations in restraint of trade. These decisions, holding illegal only
those restraints of trade which are "unreasonable," posited almost
unlimited discretion in the judiciary.13 As Mr. Justice Harlan noted,
4 The candidates included William Howard Taft, Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow
Wilson. The latter was to set the tone for the future Federal Trade Commission.
5 R. HOFSTAnTE, TiE AMERLCAN POLrrIcAL TRADrrON AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT
251 (1948).
6 If the government is to tell big business men how to run their business, then
don't you see that big business men have to get closer to the government even
than they are now? Don't you see that they must capture the government, in
order not to be restrained too much by it?
W. WILSON, THE NEw FREEDOM 122 (Prentice-Hall ed. 1961).
71d. at 101.
s Id. at 108.
9 We had said to all the world, "America was created to break every kind of
monopoly, and to set men free, upon a footing of equality, upon a footing of
opportunity, to match their brains and their energies ... 
Id. at 45.
10 15 US.C. § 1 et seq. (1964), formerly 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
11221 U.S. 1 (1911).
12221 U.S. 106 (1911).
13 See Votaw, Antitrust in 1914- The Climate of Opinion, 24 A.B.A. ArmusT
SEcrbON 14, 20 (1964).
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the injection of the rule of reasonableness or unreasonableness
would lead to the greatest variableness and uncertainty in the
enforcement of the law. The defense of reasonable restraint would
be made in every case and there would be as many different rules
of reasonableness as cases, courts, and juries.14
Liberal elements were alarmed because such an uncertain standard
might seriously diminish the opportunities for successful antitrust
prosecution, while the business community objected because the lati-
tude given judicial discretion could lead to unduly hazardous antitrust
exposure. 15 Consequently, both Standard Oil and American Tobacco
clearly inspired considerable public pressure for greater clarity in anti-
trust enforcement. 6 Hence, the stage for passage of the FTCA was set
by a combination of factors - desire to protect freedom of opportunity
by requiring fair competition, disillusion with the courts, and demand
for certainty in the law.
Wilson's program, responding to public pressure for clarification
of the law, envisaged legislation which would ease business uncertainty
by defining specific antitrust violations with particularity. Under the
circumstances, it is ironic that the FTC was to be given the broadest
conceivable mandate under its organic act, namely, that of defining and
prohibiting "unfair methods of competition." It represented a massive
grant of discretionary authority to an administrative agency at a time
when Congress desired to circumscribe judicial discretion in the anti-
trust area.
The legislative history of the FTCA and the Clayton Act 17 mirrors
the conflict between the desire to clarify the law and the need to pro-
vide for a broad range of contingencies. 8 By enacting both statutes,
Congress, in the antitrust area at least, reached an accommodation be-
tween the two objectives. The Clayton Act did prohibit certain types of
price discrimination and merger, while the FTCA resulted from Con-
gress' reluctance to embark on the "endless task" of defining and pro-
14 Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 US. 1, 97 (1911) (Harlan, J.,
concurring and dissenting) (emphasis in original).
15 See Votaw, supra note 13.
16 Woodrow Wilson expressed the general sentiment with the statement:
It is of capital importance that businessmen of this country should be relieved of
all uncertainties of law with regard to their enterprises and investments and a
clear path indicated which they can travel without anxiety. It is as important
they should be relieved of embarrassment and set free to prosper as that private
monopoly should be destroyed. The ways of action should be thrown wide open.
16 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PREsIDENr 7910 (Bureau of Nat'l Lit. ed. 1922).
17 15 U.S.C. § 14 et seq. (1964), formerly 38 Stat. 731 (1914).
18 For an exhaustive analysis of the legislative history, see Baker & Baum, Section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act: A Continuing Process of Redefinition, 7 Vxu.. L.
Ray. 517 (1962); Montague, Unfair Methods of Competition, 25 YALE L.J. 20 (1915).
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hibiting unfair trade practices in response to changing business condi-
tions and the ingenuity of law violators.19 Significantly, the criterion
of unfair methods of competition, in addition to reaching activities
not previously punished or prevented under the antitrust laws, was
also intended "to check monopoly in the embryo." 20 The concept of
incipiency, implicit in the FTCA's statutory scheme, was intended to
provide the agency with considerable latitude in defining a new law-
merchant.21
The passage of the Act saw another significant departure from
Wilson's original concept, which envisaged the Commission as an in-
strument limited to the functions of information, publicity and guid-
ance. The Commission, in Wilson's earlier proposal, was to "[substi-
tute] counsel and accommodation for the harsher processes of legal
restraint,"22 and the original bill to create the Commission failed to
provide it with regulatory power. Instead, the agency "was to be an inves-
tigating and advisory body, hardly more than an amplification of the
existing Bureau of Corporations." 23 Nevertheless, the statute in its final
form bestowed upon the Commission the duty of issuing complaints
when it had reason to believe the law was violated, and the power to
issue orders to prevent further unfair trade practices. Thus, the Com-
mission, in addition to its powers of information and publicity, also
acquired the duty to regulate. This was significant since, at least ini-
tially, its most important contributions in defining "unfair methods of
competition" would stem from the principles established in its adjudi-
cative cases.
The legislative history and the statutory text did not define with
precision the direction of enforcement. An examination of congres-
sional debates reveals some dissent to the broad mandate granted the
Commission 24 as well as confusion as to its meaning. Moreover, the Com-
19 In the words of Senator Hollis, a proponent of a broad gauged approach to the
problem:
It is impossible to frame a set of definitions which embraces all unfair trade
practices .... With each invention there would arise a public demand for
Congress to make a new definition and prohibition .... If Congress adopts the
method of definition it will undertake an endless task.
51 CONG. REc. 12,147 (1914) (remarks of Senator Hollis).
2051 CONG. REc. 12,030 (1914) (remarks of Senator Newlands).
21 See 51 CONG. RiEc. 11,593 (1914) (remarks of Senator Saulsbury).
22 16 MESSAGES AND PAPFM OF THE PRESImENTS 8158 (Bureau of Nat'l Lit. ed. 1922).
23 Rublee, The Original Plan and Early History of the Federal Trade Commission,
11 AcAD. POL. SCL PRoc. 114, 115 (1926).
24 See, eg., remarks of Senator Sterling:
No, Mr. President, we overload this Commission. Instead of giving them something
reasonably tangible, certain or even in the language of the law "capable of being
made certain" we give them something, to keep the public guessing, to the injury
of both business and the public ....
51 CONG. REc. 12,213 (1914).
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missioners themselves were not certain of the Commission's role and
differed as to its objectives. The first chairman of the Commission,
Joseph E. Davies, firmly believed in the Wilsonian concept of the FTC
as an agency which would substitute counsel for legal restraint. The
tenor of his speeches in the period 1915-1916 clearly illustrated his
preference for accommodation and assistance to business, as opposed to
the exercise of the regulatory functions set forth in section 5 of the
Act.25
The variance between Wilson's original proposals and the enforce-
ment scheme provided under section 5 had continuing effect on the
Commission's work. In the succeeding 54 year period, the emphasis
placed on formal enforcement proceedings and informal accommoda-
tion shifted periodically.26 In any event, it appears that the legal prin-
ciple distilled by the Commission in defining "unfair methods of com-
petition" emerged primarily from its formal decisions and reports,
which provided the framework for the Commission's enforcement and
rule-making procedures. In this connection, the recurring disagree-
ment on the publicity to be given to the unfair acts and practices
uncovered was a vital issue; without publicity the Commission's actions
could not take root as legal precedent 27 and develop the new law-mer-
chant intended by Congress.
25 [It is in the interest of the public that processes of suitable and amicable
accommodation should be first exhausted by the Federal Trade Commission
before it should institute formal complaints embarking upon a long and technical
course of legal procedure.
Address by Joseph E. Davies, Competition and Democracy, Convention of the Associated
Advertising Clubs of the World, Chicago, Ill., June 20, 1915 (mimeo).
[T]he fact that there may be comparatively few complaints brought by this body
[the FTC] is therefore not an indication that relief is not being accorded; but
may be in fact an indication that the effectiveness of this agency is being demon-
strated along the lines contemplated by those who sought its enactment....
Address by Joseph E. Davies, The European War and Industrial Democracy, American
Manufacturers Export Association, New York City, Dec. 21, 1915, at 9 (mimeo). (It is
difficult to divine the individual Commissioner's point of view in the agency's formative
years, since the first decisions of the Commission were formalistic and stylized. In this
period, primary reliance must be placed on speeches, recollections, or dissents.)26E.g., the 1966 annual report of the FTC emphasized the "Federal Trade Com-
mission's recent policy to provide more guidance to American businessmen on how to
comply with the trade laws as a happy alternative to a patternless attack on violators."
FTC ANN. REP. 1 (1966).
27 Compare the views in 1915 of Commissioner Davies, explaining why "[o]f these
complaints and their disposition, the public has not heard much" because no information
on Commission cases should go out unless formal complaint issued and that in any
event informal settlement was preferable because relief to the injured party was
speedier," Davies, The European War and Industrial Democracy, supra note 25, at 8,
with the views of Commissioner Thompson approximately 10 years later:
when a corporation has practiced a deception, it must inevitably suffer some
hardship if there is to be established a legal precedent for the information and
guidance of all members of the industry. This can not be done unless the
Commission, after functioning in such a case as the present one, publishes the facts
1970]
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The legislative history affords few clues as to the impetus for the
Commission's actions in the area of deception and misleading adver-
tising. Some 12 years after passage of the FTCA, George Rublee, one
of the first Commissioners and one of the architects of the Act, de-
clared:
there was no intention to cover merely deceptive or dishonest
practices by the prohibition of unfair methods of competition.
Fraudulent practices belong in an altogether different category
from monopolistic practices .... The only objection to extending
the meaning to fraudulent practices was that this would so increase
the Commission's labors that with its limited appropriations and
personnel it would not be able to give sufficient attention to the
real task for which it was established. 28
Thus, it may be noted parenthetically that at the outset, the Commis-
sion and its members were faced with and divided over the issue of its
mission and priorities. 29
The issue of false advertising and dishonesty did not, except in a
peripheral way, enter into the congressional debates over the FTCA.
Two possible exceptions involved "passing off" one's own merchandise
as that of another, and defamation of competitors and disparagement of
their goods, both of which were considered unfair at common law.30
Clearly, however, although both practices involve elements of dis-
honesty, the main thrust of the objections thereto was the adverse im-
pact on competitors, rather than the deception of the consumer.
Moreover, it appears that one element of the Act, namely, the re-
quirement that the Commission act in "the public interest," was urged
upon Congress to provide the agency with a rationale for foregoing,
or at least minimizing, its activity in the area of fraud and deception.31
upon which the order is based. Such facts will then chart the sea of fair
competition for the future on the practice complained of.
Mack, Miller Candle Co., 8 F.T.C. 542, 546 (1925) (dissenting opinion).
28 Rublee, supra note 23, at 114, 117-18. See also G. ALEXANDER, HONESY AND
COMPETITION 1 (1967), wherein the author states: "it helps to recall that the agency was
designed as an antidote to the rule of reason rather than as an enforcer of honesty in
commerce .... " See also Millstein, The Federal Trade Commission and False Advertising,
64 COLUM. L. REV. 439 (1964).
29 Compare REPORT OF THE ABA COMtMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (1969) with STAFF OF THE SENATE CoMr. ON THE JUDIcIARY, 91sr CONG., 1ST
SESS., RESPONSES TO QUESTIONNAIRE ON CrrIzEN INVOLVEMENT AND RESPONSIVE AGENCY
DECISION-MAKING (Comm. Print 1969).
80 See 51 CONG. REc. 11,107 (1914) (remarks of Senator Robinson). See also FTC,
MEMORANDUM ON UNFAIR COMPETITION AT COMMON LAW 234-79 (1916).
31 The object [of the public interest requirement] was simply and solely to protect
the Commission from being overloaded in case "unfair methods of competition"
should be construed as extending to fraudulent practices. There was no intention
to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Commission by reference to the public
interest ....
Rublee, supra note 23, at 118.
[VOL. 414:597
UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION
Paradoxically, this requirement supplied, at least implicitly, the basis
for proceeding against deception. For example, Senator Cummins, one
of the chief proponents of the statute, remarked that "the unfairness
must be tinctured with unfairness to the public; not merely with un-
fairness to the rival or competitor," and further stated that "there must
be in the imposture or in the vicious practice or method something
that has a tendency to affect the people of the country or be injurious
to their welfare." 32 While it was clearly intended that the Commission
refrain from interfering in purely private disputes between competi-
tors, "impostures" affecting or deceiving the public might justify a
Commission proceeding. In a somewhat inchoate way, therefore, the
Commission had been afforded the opportunity to combat consumer
deception. The actual direction of enforcement taken under the statute
and the scope given to the standard of "unfair methods of competition"
would depend upon a number of variables, including the predilections
of the individual Commissioners, the pressures brought to bear on the
agency, and the complaints from both the public and the business com-
munity.
Despite the uncertainty of their mandate in the area of consumer
protection, the members of the Commission quickly indicated an
interest in the goal of honesty in the market place for its own sake,
notwithstanding the statutory text's indication that the practice pro-
ceeded against must have an adverse effect on competition as a pre-
requisite to Commission action. For example, in the second year of its
operation, the Commission's chairman delivered a moralizing dis-
course on the necessity of honesty in advertising, and in effect, spon-
sored business self-regulation to prevent deception.33 Moreover, in
addition to complaints alleging clear-cut antitrust or restraint of trade
violations, the agency received many charges involving false advertising
and misbranding.34 Clearly, the Commission's response to such com-
plaints furnished much of the impetus for its initial and hesitant steps
in the consumer protection area.35 At the same time, the stereotyped
and formalistic nature of the findings in the agency's decisions evi-
32 51 CONG. REc. 11,105 (1914) (remarks of Senator Cummins) (emphasis supplied).
33 Advertising affords to men an abundant opportunity to make quick money
dishonestly. There is no line that requires honesty to a greater degree than
advertising.
Address by Joseph E. Davies, Cleveland Advertising Club, Apr. 19, 1916, at 4 (mimeo.).
34 See Davies, The European War and Industrial Democracy, supra note 25.
35 Recently, of course, the Commission has been subjected to considerable criticism
for disregarding planning for "ad hoc and unordered responses to individual problems
as they arise." REPORT OF THE ABA COMISSION To STUDY THE FEDERAL TmuE CosuSSION
supra note 29. See also RESPONSES To QUEsIONNA RE ON CrTIZEN INVOLVEMENT ANI RESPoN-
SiVE AGENcY DECISION-AKING, supra note 29, at 232 (responses of Commissioner Nicholson).
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dently facilitated the initial proceedings against consumer deception. 36
The first decisions of the Commission involving deceptive practices
made only boiler plate findings on "damage to the trade and [competi-
tors]." 37 Such generalizations, one suspects, permitted the Commission
to emphasize the deception, while glossing over the more complex issue
of its impact as an unfair method of competition. As a result, it appears,
as a practical matter, that in some cases at least, the consumer protec-
tion goal began to outweigh the statutory objective of protecting com-
petition. In effect, the Commission's formalistic, and in some instances
nonexistent findings3" on the competitive impact of the deceptive prac-
tices under consideration, permitted it to proceed in matters where,
although the consumer deception might have been evident, the impact
on competition seemed slight.
Finally, it is at least arguable that political and other pressures in
the antitrust area contributed to the agency's early decision to allocate
a healthy share of its resources to the less complex and possibly less
controversial cases involving deception. The tribulations which the
Commission experienced after embarking on certain economic inves-
tigations which involved hard core antitrust issues (e.g., in the meat
packing industry) have been explored at length elsewhere, and that
task need not be repeated here.39 Suffice it to say that the very latitude
of the discretion accorded the agency in formulating a new law-mer-
36 E.g., one of the earliest commentators on the Commission noted:
There is a general complaint among attorneys, at the present time, that it is
impossible to ascertain from the published decisions of the Federal Trade
Commission what points were decided and what were the grounds of decision ...
[implying further the reader of the Commission's decisions was not in a position
to determine] what has been decided and by what reasoning the decision is
supported.
G. HENDERSON, Tm FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 335-36 (1924).
37 Circle Cilk Co., 1 F.T.C. 13, 15 (1916) (a misbranding case involving the use of
the term "Cilk" for a non-silk product).
8 See, e.g., Taiyo Trading Co., 3 F.T.C. 199 (1921) (misrepresentation of Japanese
matches as Swedish); Lewis Pelstring, 3 F.T.C. 42 (1920) (misrepresentation of goods as
government supplies); Plomo Specialty Mfg. Co. & Riverside Ref. Co., 2 F.T.C. 195 (1919)
(misrepresentation and misbranding of turpentine). In Taiyo, the complaint alleged that
the practice in question had "the effect of stifling and suppressing competition," but the
operative finding on which the order was based stated without reference to the
competitive impact, that "the effect will be to mislead and deceive the purchasing public."
39See generally T. BLAISDELL, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (1932); Herring,
Politics, Personalities and the Federal Trade Commission, Part 1, 28 Am. POL. Sci. Rxv.
1016 (1934), Part 11, 29 Am. POL. Sci. REv. 21 (1935). As noted by one of the Commission's
members in that period:
There may be such a thing in Government work as being too zealous or active
and perhaps too successful. Witness the ceaseless watch of the Commission over
... the meat packing industry .... As a reward for its efforts the Commission's
jurisdiction over the packing industry was transferred, in 1921, to the Department
of Agriculture under what is known as the Packers and Stockyards Act.
Thompson, Highlights In the Evolution Of The Federal Trade Commission, 8 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 257, 273-74 (1940).
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chant also permitted the accumulation and application of various pres-
sures against its activities in the sensitive anti-monopoly area.40 "Sup-
pression of false advertising," on the other hand, seemed "universally
applauded." 41 However, by 1932 even friendly critics, while endorsing
the Commission's attack on dishonesty, suggested that the emphasis of
its enforcement efforts ignored the more fundamental task of main-
taining competition,42 a sentiment shared by certain of the Commis-
sioners in that period.43 Nevertheless, it is the opinion of the authors,
formed from a perspective of some 55 years since the agency's founda-
tion, that the Commission's record should be judged not so much by
the intrinsic importance of the particular cases brought in that era, but
rather by whether the cases as a whole laid a bedrock for a national
policy of consumer protection.
THE COMMISSION'S CONSUMER PROTECTION MISSION ESTABLISHED
The criticisms of the Commission's first ventures in the anti-decep-
tion field as a departure from its primary antitrust function, suggest
that an assessment of the criteria for holding deception an unfair
method of competition is in order. Initially, such standards were de-
lineated primarily in the opinions of the judiciary which scrutinized
Commission orders. The first Supreme Court review of a Commission
proceeding holding that, as a matter of law, the courts and not the
Commission would ultimately determine the scope of "unfair methods
of competition,"' ' may well have inhibited any inclination existing at
the administrative level to articulate fully the basis of the Commission's
decisions.
The Commission's analysis of competitive impact in its early con-
sumer deception cases was not framed in economic terms. Had it been
concerned with the economic impact of deception on competition, the
40 See Herring, Part I, supra note 39, at 1018.
41 G. A xAmNER, supra note 28, at xlii.
42 Watkins, The Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Laws, in THE FEDmA.
ANrrrausr LAws, A Snw'osiur (M. Handler ed. 1932). This commentator noted that in
the two fiscal years preceding 1932, 521 out of 572 FTC proceedings, or 91 percent, were
concerned with false and misleading advertising, misbranding and misuse of trade names;
90.4 percent of these resulted in orders to cease and desist. 71.8 percent of those dismissed
and 94.4 percent of those resulting in stipulation were of the same category. According to
the same observer, "this record indicates a startling shift from the conception of its
functions which Congress and the public had in founding the Federal Trade Commission."
Id. at 113.
43 See, e.g., Herring, Part I, supra note 39, at 1021:
[The F.T.C.'s] chief function today as Abram F. Myers has said with some
exaggeration, is "preventing" false and misleading advertising in reference to
hair restorers, anti.-fat remedies, etc.-a somewhat inglorious end to a noble
experiment.
44 See FTC v. Gratz, 253 US. 421, 427 (1920).
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agency could have considered the actual or prospective effect of the
practice in the context of the market structure in which it occurred.45
Notwithstanding the failure to undertake such an analysis, the Com-
mission's approach in the deceptive practice area was upheld by the
courts. One reason the Commission was not held to a more rigorous
standard evidently stems from the congressional intent that unfair
trade practices be halted in their incipiency.46 Another factor was the
Wilsonian preoccupation with fairness underlying the Act.47 Clearly,
dishonesty is patently unfair; unlike other practices such as exclusive
dealing, there is no necessity for an analysis of the market results to
reach that conclusion.48 In short, per se rules were more apt to develop
in the anti-deception area of the Commission's activities- the tend-
ency being to assume the requisite impact on competition if com-
petitors were present. This is evidenced by Sears Roebuck & Co. v.
FTC,4 9 the first judicial review of a Commission order involving de-
ceptive practices. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, noting
that "the Commissioners are not required to aver and prove that any
competitor has been damaged or that any purchaser has been de-
ceived,"50 held that the necessary foundation for a Commission order
could be laid by a finding of "a capacity or a tendency to injure com-
petitors directly or through deception of purchasers."
The Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Brandeis in
FTC v. Winsted Hosiery Co.,51 firmly established the Commission's
jurisdiction over deceptive practices as an unfair method of competi-
45 See id. at 429 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The case suggests the relevance to a deter-
mination of illegality of such factors as the size, position and relationship of competitors
in a market.
46 Senator Cummins stated:
Unfair competition must usually proceed to great lengths and be destructive of
competition before it can be seized and denounced by the antitrust law. In
other cases it must be associated with, coupled with, other and unlawful vicious
practices in order to bring the person or the corporation guilty of the practice
within the scope of the antitrust law. The purpose of this bill in this section
and in other sections which I hope will be added to it, is to seize the offender
before his ravages have gone to the length necessary in order to bring him
within the law that we already have.
57 CONG. REc. 11,455 (1914).
47 See generally W. WILSON, supra note 6.
48 Cf. Hastings Mfg. Co. v. FTC, 153 F.2d 253 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S.
853 (1946) (involving the practice of buying up competitors' goods from retailers' shelves).
The Sixth Circuit noted that
acts not in themselves illegal or criminal, or even immoral, may, when repeated
and continued and their impact upon commerce is fully revealed constitute an
unfair method of competition within the scope of the Commission's authority to
regulate and forbid ....
Id. at 257 (emphasis supplied).
49 258 F. 307 (7th Cir. 1919).
5o ld. at 311.
51258 U.S. 483 (1922).
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tion, while establishing at the same time, what was in effect, a pre-
sumption of the requisite competitive impact where deception or
capacity to deceive the public could be demonstrated. Significantly, the
question of whether such practices were within the scope of the FTCA
was squarely before the Court. The Second Circuit, in reversing the
Commission's decision, had held:
Conscientious manufacturers may prefer not to use a label which is
capable of misleading and it may be that it will be desirable to
prevent the use of the particular labels, but it is, in our opinion,
not within the province of the Federal Trade Commission to do
80.52
Rejecting the Second Circuit's contention that since the misbranding
in question was common in the trade, it could not constitute an unfair
method of competition vis--vis other competitors, the Supreme Court
stated:
The labels in question are literally false .... All are, as the com-
mission found, calculated to deceive and do in fact deceive a sub-
stantial portion of the purchasing public.... The facts show that
it is to the interest of the public that a proceeding to stop the prac-
tice be brought. And they show also that the practice constitutes
an unfair method of competition... as against manufacturers...
who brand their product truthfully. For when misbranded goods
attract customers by means of the fraud which they perpetrate,
trade is diverted from the producer of truthfully marked goods.
That these honest manufacturers might protect their trade by also
resorting to deceptive labels is no defense to this proceeding
brought against the Winsted Co. in the public interest.53
An examination of the Commission's findings on this point 4 indicates
that they are ambiguous as to the identity and extent of the "honest
competition" affected. Thus, despite the language used, on the facts
of the case it appears that the Supreme Court was more concerned with
the ethical principle involved than with the effect of the practice on
competition. As noted by one commentator:
The court's emphasis upon the injury to honest competitors should
be noted. There is no intimation in the opinion, however, that the
decision would have been different had such misrepresentation
become so common that there were no honest competitors in the
industry .... 5
52NWinsted Hosiery Co. v. FTC, 272 F. 957, 961 (2d Cir. 1921), rev'd, 258 U.S. 483
(1922) (a misbranding case involving woolen underwear).
53 258 U.S. at 493.
54 Winsted Hosiery Co., 3 F.T.C. 189 (1921).
55 Handler, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission Over False Advertising,
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In Winsted there may be discerned the evolution of section 5 of
the FTCA toward an ethical imperative concerned with objectives over
and above the goal of maintaining competition- a theme developed
at various times by several of the circuit courts."' For example, the
Second Circuit recognized the primacy of the consumer protection goal
in FTC v. Balme,5 7 in which it stated:
The purchasing public should be protected from deception, if that
deception results in their securing an article or product which they
did not intend to purchase .... The test of unfair competition is
whether the natural and probable result of the use by a respondent
of a label which is deceptive to the ordinary purchaser makes him
unwittingly, under ordinary conditions, purchase that which he
did not intend to buy.58
Also facilitating the Commission's assumption of its role as a protector
of consumer interests were decisions holding it unnecessary to prove
injury to particular interests59 or financial loss to the consuming
public.60 Equally significant in this development were judicial affirma-
tions of Commission proceedings in which injury to competition from
deception was presumed. For example, in E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc. v.
FTC,"' the Second Circuit stated that "selling by the use of false and
misleading statements necessarily injures or tends to injure [competi-
tion].18 2 Other decisions suggested that it would require little evidence
to provide the requisite showing of injury to competition, and that the
31 COLUM. L. RaV. 527, 544 (1931). This point was not overlooked by the Second Circuit,
which, some two weeks after its reversal in Winsted, noted that "the Supreme Court...
has established [in Winsted] the principle that advertisements which are false in fact
constitute an unfair method of competition, although it was commonly practiced and not
intended to mislead the trade." Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC, 281 F. 744, 752 (2d
Cir. 1922). Clearly, the injury to the consumer outweighed the impact on competition.
56 See, e.g., Royal Baking Powder Co. v. FTC, 281 F. 744, 753 (2d Cir. 1922), where
the court recognized that the Act was aimed at dishonest practices as such, and held that
businessmen could not be permitted to rely thereon either for profit or to maintain their
business standing.
5723 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1928), cert. denied, 277 US. 598 (1928).
58 Id. at 620. See also Indiana Quartered Oak Co. v. FTC, 26 F.2d 340 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 278 U.S. 623 (1928).
59 "[Ilt is the totality of all interests conceived as the public interest which is decisive."
Fioret Sales Co. v. FTC, 100 F.2d 358, 359 (2d Cir. 1938).
60 FTC v. F.A. Martoccio Co., 87 F.2d 561, 564 (8th Cir. 1937).
6177 F.2d 886 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 US. 617 (1935). See also FTC v. Artloom
Corp., 69 F.2d 36, 38 (3d Cir. 1934): "The premise of misbranding being supported by the
Commission's finding, the conclusion follows that, when the respondent sold its mis-
branded rugs in commerce it thereby harmed its competitors and deluded the ultimate
consumers." To the same effect, see cases holding it is unnecessary to show losses to
particular competitors. E.g., Ford Motor Co. v. FTC, 120 F.2d 175 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
314 U.S. 668 (1941); Alberty v. FTC, 118 F.2d 669 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 314 US. 630
(1941).
62 77 F.2d at 888.
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courts might even take judicial notice thereof,6 3 thereby implying that
little or no analysis of competitive effect was required in this area. In-
deed, the development of the Commission's anti-deception jurisdiction
by the judiciary may be summed up in the holding of the Third Circuit
that the trend of judicial decision was to "broaden the meaning of
competition in the interests of consumer protection. ' 64 Similarly, that
circuit had previously noted that the "trend is away from the require-
ment of injury to a particular competitor and toward the protection of
the general consumer."6 5
Nevertheless, this expansion of the concept of competition and the
Commission's assumption of the task of consumer protection was not
unchallenged. A number of judicial decisions stressed the supple-
mentary relationship of the FTCA to the Sherman Antitrust and Clay-
ton Acts, both of which involved competitive practices having more
clearly delineated antitrust implications. In that context, the tendency
was to view the Commission's findings on the competitive impact of the
deception with more skepticism. In such decisions, the tendency was
to find the causal nexus between deception and competitive harm too
remote to justify action under the statute, even though the deceptive
practice under consideration (such as fictitious pricing) was found
"reprehensible" by the court.6 6 The same tendency was indicated by
another circuit court decision involving misrepresentation of business
status. Respondents had used the words "Mill" or "Milling" in their
corporate or trade name despite the fact that they did not grind wheat
into flour.67 The circuit court, subsequently overruled by the Supreme
Court, held there was no threat to competition. Rather, the court
believed that the Commission's order would have stifled rather than
preserved competition, since there was "no oppression of the weak by
the strong, the grinding millers being strong concerns organized into
powerful trade organizations.""6 Clearly, the court in this instance
63 See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 86 F.2d 692, 695 (2d Cir. 1936), rev'd on other
grounds, 302 US. 112 (1937) (involving deceptive practices on the part of a nationwide
distributor of encyclopedias).
64 Belmont Laboratories, Inc. v. FTC, 103 F.2d 538, 542 (3d Cir. 1939).
65 Minter Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 69, 70 (3d Cir. 1939).
66 Chicago Portrait Co. v. FTC, 4 F.2d 759, 762 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 269 U.S. 556
(1925), quoting FTC v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 261 U.S. 463, 475-76 (1923):
"The powers of the Commission are limited by the statutes. It has no general
authority to compel competitors to a common level, to interfere with ordinary
business methods or to prescribe arbitrary standards for those engaged in the
conflict for advantage called competition. The great purpose of both statutes
(Clayton and Federal Trade Comm. Acts) was to advance the public interest by
securing fair opportunity for the play of the contending forces ordinarily en-
gendered by an honest desire for gain."
67 Royal Milling Co. v. FTC, 58 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1932), rev'd., 288 US. 212 (1933).
68 Id. at 583.
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postulated an economic test, albeit crude, as to the result of the decep-
tion. Had such an approach been universally adopted, it is unlikely
that section 5's potential in the consumer protection area could have
been developed.
The most serious challenge to the Commission's consumer pro-
tection activities culminated in the Supreme Court's decision in FTC
v. Raladam Co.69 Raladam involved an obesity remedy having admitted
health hazards in the case of unsupervised lay use. The Sixth Circuit,70
holding that the Commission had failed to demonstrate the existence
of legitimate competition affected by the deception complained of, had
stated that the Act was not intended to protect either the medical pro-
fession or respondent's "relatively disreputable" competitors who were
engaged in the same practices. Clearly, the court relied on its view that
[t]he Commission came into being as an aid to the enforcement of
the general governmental antitrust and anti-monopoly policy, and
that its lawful jurisdiction did not go beyond the limits of fair rela-
tionship to that policy .... 71
Consequently, it held, in effect, that consumer protection was a for-
tuitous by-product, rather than a primary goal of Commission proceed-
ings under the FTCA.72 Yet, if this principle is followed to its logical
conclusion, it might be argued that most Commission anti-deception
proceedings should not have been brought at all; the standard of proof
as to competitive effect would have been too rigorous for successful
prosecution.
The Supreme Court, adopting the Sixth Circuit's position that
section 5 of the Act supplemented general antitrust policy, affirmed the
dismissal on the ground that the Commission had failed to document
"the existence of some substantial competition to be affected" by the
alleged deception.73 However, failing to proceed further, the Court
refused to require economic analysis in determining the actual or
potential restraint on competition in anti-deception cases. Thus, the
69 283 U.S. 643 (1931).
70 Raladam Co. v. FTC, 42 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1930), aff'd, 283 U.S. 643 (1931). See also
Berkey & Gay Furniture Co. v. FTC, 42 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1930); Ohio Leather Co. v.
FTC, 45 F.2d 39, 42 (6th Cir. 1930), where the court observed that
there is no jurisdiction in the Commission to make an order of this kind unless
there is a legitimate trade which equitably deserves protection in order that the
defendant's unfair methods may not tend to restrain the trade of the fair and
legitimate competitors ....
7142 F.2d at 435. Interestingly, the author of the Raladam opinion had seven years
earlier dissented in L.B. Silver Co. v. FTC, 289 F. 985, 992-93 (6th Cir. 1923), contending
that the Commission's anti-deception work had to have a clear antitrust mission, and that
the censorship of business was generally beyond its jurisdiction.
72 Cf. FTC v. Balme, 23 F.2d 615 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 598 (1928).
78 283 U.S. at 648.
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decision held only that in consumer protection cases, the Commission
must prove the existence of competition before it had jurisdiction to
proceed. Significantly, the test of competitive effect posed by the Court
was no more rigorous than that previously followed by the Commis-
sion, i.e., permitting the inference of injury to competition when the
existence of legitimate competition had been documented.74
The Commission's actions in the post-Raladam period indicate
that its reversal in that case did not dampen its enthusiasm for con-
sumer protection, and that its priorities, as a practical matter, remained
unchanged. 75 In seeking legislative amelioration of Raladam, the Com-
mission did not argue that it could no longer proceed in this area;
rather, it contended it would be without jurisdiction when the offender
enjoyed a monopoly, and when all competitors in the field were equally
guilty.76 The thrust of the Commission's argument for revision of the
Act, to encompass unfair and deceptive acts and practices, was that
proving the existence of competition was too time consuming and
expensive. 77 One of the Commissioners testifying on the proposed revi-
sion characterized the requirements as involving "needless expense to
prove an obvious fact upon a mere technicality."78 Clearly, the Com-
mission's view of the rudimentary market analysis required to establish
competition, as a "technicality" blocking consumer protection, envis-
aged a scheme of priorities quite different from the Raladam Court's
view of the antitrust objectives of the Act.79
74 [1]t is not necessary that the facts point to any particular trader or traders. It is
enough that there be present or potential substantial competition, which is shown
by proof, or appears by necessary inference to have been injured, or to be
clearly threatened with injury, to a substantial extent, by the use of the unfair
methods complained of.
Id. at 651. See also FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212 (1933), rejecting, as a practical
matter, the "economic effects" test posed by the Sixth Circuit in its reversal of the
Commission's cease and desist order. 58 F.2d 581 (6th Cir. 1932).
75 [Mjy. friends, it is the rarest case in the world, if it ever exists, where the
consuming public is adversely affected by false and misleading advertisements
that a competitor is not also affected, and, consequently, we would have the
requisite showing of competition .... [l]t is not even necessary to name the
competitors ... it is just necessary to show that the respondent has competition.
Statement by FTC Chairman Ewin L. Davis, Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm.
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Aug. 10, 1935, at 4-5 (mimeo.).
76 See Hearings on S. 3744 Before the Senate Comm. on Interstate Commerce, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1936).
77 Id. at 14 (statement of Commissioner Davis).
78 See Hearing on HR. 3143 Before the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1937).
79 It is illuminating that only two years after Raladam, the Commission held, in
Nancy Lee Institute, 17 F.T.C. 314 (1933), as an unfair method of competition, the
misrepresentation of a quack remedy to enhance the beauty of the female form,
although its findings revealed only competitors selling equally worthless products. Clearly,
the Commission's concern was not to protect one knave from another, but rather to shield
the public from deception.
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With the passage of the Wheeler-Lea Amendment,0 outlawing
"unfair or deceptive acts or practices," Congress, for the first time,
established a national consumer protection policy. The amendment
gave legislative sanction to the Commission's approach by making the
consumer "of equal concern, before the law, with the merch~ant or
manufacturer injured by the unfair methods of a dishonest com-
petitor."81 Clearly, the Commission, by its activities in the anti-decep-
tion area, had established its credentials as a representative of the
consumer interest to the satisfaction of Congress. 2 More significantly,
it is a measure of the Commission's accomplishment that its proceed-
ings established the necessity for active federal intervention on behalf
of the consuming public.
COMMISSION PRECEDENT AS A FOUNDATION FOR CONSUMERISM
The major function of the Commission is to define unfair and
deceptive practices with particularity. A comprehensive description of
the details of that effort, ranging from misbranding to lottery schemes,
is not within the scope of this paper.8 3 However, the establishment by
the Commission of broad criteria defining consumer rights during that
process was equally significant. These evolved primarily from the gen-
eral standards developed for ascertaining the impact of advertising on
the public, the determination that even the less perceptive consumer
deserves protection, and the development of what may be termed as
the consumer's right to know.
Critical to a delineation of business' obligations to the consumer
was the definition of the audience to be shielded from deception. This,
of necessity, would govern the standards for evaluating the fairness of
commercial appeals to the public. One of the first cases dealing with
this issue held:
The law is not made for the protection of experts, but for the
public -that vast multitude which includes the ignorant, the un-
80 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1964), formerly 52 Stat. 111 (1938).
81 H.R. REP. No. 1613, 75th Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1937).
82 The Federal Trade Commission has the machinery azid trained personnel to
investigate in a proceeding against false advertising of all industries and all
commodities . . . .The Federal Trade Commission as an independent quasi-
judicial body, has a procedure better calculated to handle multitudinous types
of advertising and to do its work to the greater confidence and satisfaction of the
public than any purely administrative body. Its work carries with it the
combined elements of searching investigation, orderly procedure, prevention
rather than penalization in minor cases, and that judicial fairness that is essential
to the enlistment of confidence by the public.
Id. at 5.
83 For a comprehensive survey of the Commission's activity in the anti-deception area,
see G. ALExA'NDE, supra note 28.
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thinking and the credulous, who, in making purchases, do not stop
to analyze, but are governed by appearances and general impres-
sions.84
Interestingly, these principles were evidently derived in large part from
trademark infringement suits and "passing-off" cases, which were con-
cerned with the private rights of competitors.8 5 This line of cases per-
haps reached its apogee in 1940, when the Second Circuit held:
if the Commission, having discretion to deal with these matters,
thinks it best to insist upon a form of advertising clear enough so
that, in the words of the prophet Isaiah, "wayfaring men, though
fools, shall not err therein," it is not for the courts to revise their
judgment.8 6
Similarly sweeping was the Third Circuit's ruling that it was the Com-
mission's function "to protect the casual, one might even say the negli-
gent, reader, as well as the vigilant and more intelligent discerning
public."8 7
This view of the consumer, embracing "the trusting as well as the
suspicious, 8 8 clearly abandoned the reasonable prudent man stan-
dard. It justified holdings to the effect that in judging the meaning of
advertisements the "important criterion is the net impression which
the advertisement is likely to make upon the general populace";89 that
statements, although literally true, may nevertheless be deceptive,90
since the Commission may examine the overall impact of the entire
commercial or advertisement; 91 that ambiguous advertisements capable
of two meanings, one of which is false, are misleading;2 and finally,
that actionable deception occurs whenever the practice has the capacity
to deceive, i.e., that no actual deception need be shown.93 Decisions
established that consumers are entitled to get what they think they are
84 23 F.2d at 620-21.
85 See, e.g., Florence Mfg. Co. v. J.C. Dowd & Co., 178 F. 73, 75 (2d Cir. 1910). See
also Rice & Hutchins, Inc. v. Vera Shoe Co., 290 F. 124 (2d Cir. 1923); and 0. & W. Thum
Co. v. Dickinson, 245 F. 609 (6th Cir. 1917), which hold that the issue of deception was
to be determined on the basis of the ordinary buyer under ordinary conditions.
86 General Motors Corp. v. FTC, 114 F.2d 33, 36 (2d Cir. 1940). Accord, Aronberg v.
FTC, 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942).
87 Parker Pen Co. v. FTC, 159 F.2d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1946).
88 FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 US. 112, 116 (1937).
89 Charles of the Ritz Distrib. Corp. v. FTC, 143 F.2d 676, 679 (2d Cir. 1944). For
another concept initially derived from trademark infringement suits, see Florence Mfg. Co.
v. J.C. Dowd Co., 178 F. 73 (2d Cir. 1910).
90 Kalwajtys v. FTC, 237 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1025 (1957).
91 Carter Prods., Inc. v. FTC, 323 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1963).
92 Rhodes Pharmacal Co. v. FTC, 208 F.2d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 1953), aff'd, 348 US. 940
(1955); Bakers Franchise Corp. v. FTC, 302 F.2d 158 (3d Cir. 1962).
93 FTC v. Balme, 23 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1928).
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getting, although the advertised substitute may be as good 94 - even
where the public preference is dictated by snobbery.95 Business was
held to a literal standard of veracity. 96 By assessing the truthfulness of
advertising in the context of the credulous as well as the suspicious
consumer, the Commission's proceedings served to erode the common-
law concept of caveat emptor as a barrier to consumer protection. 97
Moreover, the courts, in weighing the interests of the "rugged indi-
vidual" against bureaucratic interference, expressly recognized an
evolution of the judicial standards of fairness to an ever "higher con-
ception of business ethics."98
Concomitantly, there began the expansion of the scope of consumer
protection from the prohibition of affirmative misrepresentation to a
requirement of affirmative disclosure of all material facts. Utilizing its
rule-making procedures, the Commission issued Trade Practice Rules
for the Rayon Industry on October 26, 1937, providing that it was
unfair to sell rayon products without disclosing clearly and unequivo-
cally that such fabrics were made of rayon.99 The rule rested simply on
the finding that the appearance of rayon simulated that of silk, and that
the public preferred the natural product. 10 Under the circumstances,
the mere appearance of the fabric, without more, had the capacity to
deceive, notwithstanding the absence of misleading representations.
Significantly, the rayon rules were promulgated under section 5's broad
ban on unfair methods of competition prior to the passage of the
Wheeler-Lea Amendment, 1 1 and its specific definition of the Commis-
sion's consumer protection mission.
94 FTC v. Algoma Lumber Co., 291 U.S. 67, 78 (1934).
95 Benton Announcements, Inc. v. FTC, 130 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1942).
96 Moretrench Corp. v. FTC, 127 F.2d 792, 795 (2d Cir. 1942).
97 See, e.g., FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112, 116 (1937), holding:
There is no duty resting upon a citizen to suspect the honesty of those with whom
he transacts business. . . .The best element of business has long since decided
that honesty should govern competitive enterprises, and that the rule of caveat
emptor should not be relied upon to reward fraud and deception.
Today, the Attorney General of New York suggests:
There is little room for application of caveat emptor between the modern mer-
chant and the twentieth century consumer. A new responsibility, that of caveat
venditor, must be added to the code of the market place. It means that the sellers
of goods and services must accept a responsibility to assist the consumer who can
no longer assist himself.
Lefkowitz, Consumer Protection Meeting the Challenge, 4 N.E. L. REv. 67 (1969).
98 Minter Bros. v. FTC, 102 F.2d 69, 71 (3d Cir. 1939).
99 FTC, TRADE PRAcTIcE RuLEs, SEFTEMBER 1935 To AucusT 1939, 95 (1940).
100 Mary Muffet, Inc., 47 F.T.C. 724 (1950), aff'd, 194 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1952).
10152 Stat. 111 (1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1964). This section of the FTCA,
relating to food, drug and cosmetic advertising, and enacted by the Wheeler-Lea Amend-
ment, expressly provided that disclosure may be required in the light of affirmative claims
by the seller even when such representations are not per se deceptive. The Commission,
however, has held this principle was encompassed within the broader ban of section 5
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This development, in the light of a mixed reception in the courts,
was far reaching. The issue was drawn squarely by the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit when it stated:
It would be ideal from the buyer's point of view if all advertise-
ments were required to describe the product with cold precision, to
enumerate with fidelity its shortcoming, and to call attention to the
circumstances in which it is valueless. And a plausible argument
can be made that an advertisement is not really truthful unless it
does all of those things. But we think that the negative function of
requiring, or encouraging, additional interesting, and perhaps use-
ful information which is not essentially to prevent falsity, are two
totally different functions. We think that Congress gave the Com-
mission the full of the former but did not give it the latter .... 102
Nevertheless, the agency's approach has generated considerable judicial
support. For example, the Commission may require affirmative disclo-
sure in future advertising to dispel false impressions created by past
deception. 0 3 Similarly, affirmative disclosure of product identity may
be required whenever one material closely resembles another, and the
public has a preference for one as against the other.10 The same prin-
ciple applies whenever the public prefers domestic over foreign prod-
ucts although there is no misrepresentation as to country of origin
either in labeling or advertising.10 5 Nor may a seller trade on the
customary assumption of the public that motor oil whose prior use re-
mains undisclosed is, in fact, virgin or crude oil.106 In short, "section
5 forbids sellers to exploit the normal expectations of consumers in
order to deceive just as it forbids sellers to create false expectations by
affirmative acts.' 1 7
This principle is particularly applicable to cases involving prod-
ucts which affect the public's health and safety, for it is in this area that
[p]eople have a right to, and by and large do, expect that adver-
tising will be completely truthful in circumstances where the conse-
quences of an untruth, half truth, or ambiguity may be personal
injury. Because they expect fair dealing in the advertising of such
products, their guard is down. 08
against "unfair or deceptive acts." See FTC, STATEMENT OF BASIS Ad PURPOSE ACCOmpANY-
INa TRADE REGULATION RULE ON CIGARETTE ADVERTISING AND LABELING 87-88 (1964).
102 Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36, 39 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
103 Haskelite Mfg. Corp. v. FTC, 127 F.2d 765 (7th Cir. 1942).
104 Mary Muffet, Inc. v. FTC, 194 F.2d 504 (2d Cir. 1952).
105 Heller & Son v. FTC, 191 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1951).
106 Mohawk Ref. Corp. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 818 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 814 (1959).
107 FTC, STATEMlENT OF BASIS ANn PURPOSE ACCOMPANYING TRADE REGULATION RULE ON
CIGARETTE ADVERTISING AND LABELING 89 (1964).
108 Zd. at 93-94.
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The Sixth Circuit, in upholding a Commission order requiring
affirmative disclosure of the fact that a patent remedy would only be
effective in a limited number of cases," 9 effectively undermined the
influence of Alberty v. FTC.110 Significantly, the court noted the influ-
ence on the consumer of "mass advertising utilizing highly developed
arts of persuasion."'' In the court's view, this phenomenon rendered
it difficult for a consumer to determine whether a product would meet
his needs. Consequently, the court concluded that the affirmative dis-
closure requirement "does not fall within the sphere of negative ad-
vertising, it merely presents to the consumer an opportunity to make
an intelligent choice.""u 2 In general, this development has vindicated
Judge Bazelon's dissent in Alberty, that "[t]he Act's purpose is to en-
courage the informative function of advertising" and to facilitate the
consuming public's evaluation of the merits of advertising claims. 113
The line of cases construing the failure to reveal material facts
to be deceptive implies that it may be equally unfair to withhold in-
formation which the consumer requires to function efficiently in the
market. With the increasing impact of mass media and the growth of
product complexity, the amount of "useful" information 14 which
sellers, as a matter of fairness, may be required to furnish can also be
expected to increase. The Commission's recently initiated Trade Regu-
lation Rule Proceedings Relating to the Care Labeling of Textile'
Products"1 5 and to the Posting of Research Ratings on Gasoline Dis-
pensing Pumps"6 are indicative of this trend, and may serve to signif-
icantly delimit the seller's responsibility in furnishing product in-
formation to buyers.
The principle operative provision of the proposed rule on care
labeling of textile products would require manufacturers and market-
ers of textile products (within the definition of the rule) to clearly
label their products with instructions for the laundering, cleaning and
other care necessary to maintain their utility and appearance, and to
certify to the consumer-purchaser that such instructions are valid and
proper. Of course, these requirements are based on the belief that the
109 Williams Co. v. FTC, 381 F.2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967).
110 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
11 381 F.2d at 890.
112 Id.
113 182 F.2d at 45 (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
114 Cf. Alberty v. FTC. 182 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
115 See Rule-Making Proceeding for Establishment of Trade Regulation Relating to
Care Labeling of Textile Products, 34 Fed. Reg. 17,776 (1969).
116 See Rule-Making for the Establishment of a Trade Regulation Rule Relating to
the Posting of Research Octane Ratings on Gasoline Dispensing Pumps, 84 Fed. Reg.
12,449 (1969).
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lack of such information may result in the impairment of the product's
utility or appearance.
In support of the proposed rule, the notice cited the recent in-
novative developments in the field of textiles which have resulted in
a proliferation of new fibers, fabrics and finishes, thereby rendering it
difficult for the consumer to make informed purchasing decisions. The
notice of rule making also noted how difficult it was for even an expert
to identify accurately, from appearance or texture alone, the fiber com-
position of particular textile products. Similarly, it stated that even
when the fiber content is known, it is equally difficult to determine
with certainty the necessary procedures to insure the fabrics' contin-
ued utility and appearance. As a result, the notice declared that the
Commission has reason to believe consumers, and even professional
cleaners and launderers, are misled with respect to the necessary pro-
cedures, and, that consumers are precluded from rationally choosing
among competing products. According to the notice, the Commission
has reason to believe that the foregoing constitutes an unfair method
of competition.
The proposed rule on posting of research octane ratings for gaso-
line dispensing pumps provides, in essence, that it constitutes an un-
fair method of competition to fail to disclose on gasoline pumps the
research octane rating of the gasoline being dispensed. In support of
the rule, the Commission stated its reasons to believe that failure to
post such information may be deceptive and unfair, since it fails to
provide the consumer with a criterion by which he can relate the
gasoline with the engine requirements of his automobile, and that, the
failure to post such information deprives the consumer of data enabling
him to determine with any precision the range of octane ratings avail-
able.112
Underlying both proposed rules is a recognition of the paradox
that the very proliferation of new products may hinder the consumer
by affording him choices which he cannot meaningfully evaluate.
Clearly, both proceedings pose the question of the extent to which
the withholding of product information may be held an unfair method
of competition in the light of dynamically changing technology.
117 Additional supporting reasons in the notice of proposed rule making are as fol-
lows: The Commission has reason to believe that some "regular" gasolines have an octane
rating lower than the "average acceptable range of 'regular' brands normally marketed
with resulting damage to engines" and possible loss of warranty protection, because the
customer unwittingly used a low octane gasoline he assumed to be a regular blend. The
notice further sets forth the Commission's reason to believe that customers may be paying
higher prices needlessly for a higher octane product than their engine may require in the
particular case.
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Consumer protection under the concept of "unfair methods" is
not limited to fraud and deception or to encouraging informative
advertising. In FTC v. R.F. Keppel & Bros.,118 the Commission and
the reviewing courts delineated as unfair those practices which the
common law and criminal statutes deemed contrary to public policy
and which "met with condemnation throughout the community.""19
Significantly, the Supreme Court, in upholding the Commission's po-
sition in Keppel, noted the vulnerable nature of the population at
which the challenged practices were aimed, namely, "children who are
unable to protect themselves."' 20
The holding of Keppel, i.e., that practices condemned throughout
the community (although not necessarily deceptive or fraudulent) and
aimed at vulnerable segments of the population are within the scope
of the FTCA, is particularly relevant when one considers the increasing
concern with the weak bargaining position of the low income segment
of our population. The literature of consumerism notes that the prob-
lems of the poor
differ in kind and intensity from the consumer problems of fam-
ilies of the middle and upper income groups [and] [t]hat the tradi-
tional subject matter and procedures of consumer education as well
as existing and proposed consumer protective legislation are in-
adequate to help the poor solve their [problems]. 121
Assuming that the low income consumer requires more than the
full disclosure remedies hitherto considered in order to solve his
unique difficulties, one method of ameliorating his problems may be
found in Keppel and other related decisions. Consider, for example,
the Commission's open housing cases. 122 These complaints charged a
number of apartment house operators in the Washington, D.C. metro-
politan area with deceptive advertising. Specifically, the complaints
alleged that the respondents had represented, directly or by implica-
tion, that apartments were available to the general public without
restrictions or limitations as to race, color, national origin or number
of family members. Yet in truth and in fact, according to the com-
plaints, the advertised apartments were not available to the general
public without restriction, and could not be rented by Negro appli-
cants or by large families.
The proposed order would have prohibited respondents from
118 291 U.S. 304 (1934).
119 Id. at 313.
120 Id.
121 FTC, NAnONAL CONSUMER PRoTEcriON HEARINGS 95 (1968) (statement of Dr. Toyer).
122 First Buckingham Community, Inc., No. 8750 (FTC May 20, 1968).
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[p]lacing any advertisement which tends to convey the false impres-
sion that the advertised housing is available for rental to the gen-
eral public without restrictions or limitations because of race,
color, national origin or number or sex of family members. 23
It is noteworthy that the complaints were based upon a charge of de-
ception. Since allegedly deceptive advertisements made no affirma-
tive representation as to the general availability of the apartments in
question, the complaints, as a practical matter, charged failure to
disclose a material fact. Moreover, the proposed remedy would have
permitted respondents to continue discriminating provided they
merely disclosed that fact. Such an outcome, of course, could not con-
ceivably have been the objective of the Commission; rather, the pro-
ceedings were initiated to arrest discrimination, and to increase the
bargaining position of certain disadvantaged segments of the Washing-
ton, D.C. population. In view of these objectives, it is arguable that
the theory of the complaints and the proposed remedy were not well
designed. The Commission might have been better advised to rely on
the line of cases beginning with Keppel, rather than those dealing with
the issue of deception. It is conceivable that the Commission could
have come to the heart of the issue more simply and effectively by al-
leging that discriminatory real estate rentals are contrary to both public
policy and developing community standards, viz., judicial decisions
in the civil rights area and the open housing legislation considered
and passed in a number of local communities, as well as the anti-dis-
crimination legislation enacted by Congress. Not only would such an
approach have been more straightforward, but it most likely would
have achieved the fundamental objectives of the Commission. At any
rate, the issue became academic with the passage of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968.124 The Commission dismissed the proceeding on the
assurance of the respondents that, in light of the Act's passage, they
had discontinued the challenged practices. Nevertheless, the open
housing complaints, (putting aside the question of whether the Com-
mission should proceed in novel areas where congressional legislation
seems imminent), clearly indicate that the precedent of Keppel has
considerable potential in those areas where consumer problems stem
primarily from a weak bargaining position rather than from deception
or lack of information.
A number of recent Commission studies have focused specifically on
123 First Buckingham Community, Inc., No. 8750 (FTC Nov. 30, 1967) (notice order
issued with complaint).
124 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. (Supp. IV 1969).
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the problems of the low-income consumer.125 They indicate that his
unique disadvantages may be traced, to a considerable degree, to the
weak bargaining position which is caused by competitive imperfections
existing in the markets in which he buys. For example, a recent staff
report to the FTC asserts that "the distribution system [in the case of
food] performs less satisfactorily in low-income areas of our inner cities
than in suburban areas."'' 26 To the extent that the poor suffer from
anemic competition in the low-income market, there is justification
for further utilization of Keppel to provide relief whenever the con-
sumer's problems are not primarily rooted in deception or lack of
information. A case in point is the availability of credit to the poor,
whose exposure to unfair trade practices seems increased in large part
by virtue of ineffective competition 27 and their lack of "psychological
or financial [resources] to protect themselves against suits for non-
payment or to resist threats of legal action," even where the transac-
tion may have been grounded in fraud or deception.128 According to
the Commission's findings, the holder in due course doctrine, in par-
ticular, has handicapped the low-income consumer. 129 The Commis-
sion has responded by alleging as deceptive the failure to disclose that
the instruments of indebtedness may be transferred to third parties,
against whom the purchaser's contractual claims and defenses would be
unavailing.13 0 To cure the deception, the Commission has required
disclosure in a number of recent cease and desist orders.' 31 However,
the question remains whether the disclosure remedy is the most effica-
cious under the circumstances which confront the low-income con-
125 See, e.g., FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON FOOD CHAIN SELUING PRACTICES IN THE Dis-
TRi-r OF COLUMBIA AND SAN FRANCISCO (1969); FTC, NATIONAL CONSUMER PROTECTION
HEARINGS (1968); FTC, REPORT ON DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CONSUMER PROTECTION PROGRAM
(1968); FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON INSTALLMENT CREDIT AND RETAIL SALES PRACTICES OF
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA RETAILERS (1968).
126 FTC, ECONOMIC REPORT ON FOOD CHAIN SELLING PRACTICES, supra note 125, at 3.
Howard Samuels, then Administrator of the Small Business Administration, testified that
it was his "strong conviction" that the consumer in the inner cities had available to him
inadequate choices in the market place. See NATIONAL CONSUMER PROTECTION HEARINGS,
supra note 121, at 9.
127 See ECONOMIC REPORT ON INSTALLMENT CREDIT, supra note 125, at xiv-xvi.
128 See REPORT ON DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CONSUMER PROTECTION PROGRAM, supra note
125, at 9.
129 Application of the holder in due course doctrine to consumer instruments has led
to many abuses. It is simply unfair to permit a vendor to sell shoddy or defective goods,
which sometimes are not even delivered, coax, wheedle or coerce the buyer into signing
a negotiable instrument . . . and, by assigning the instrument, [to a third party] prevent
the deceived or defrauded consumer from asserting his legitimate defenses in an action
on the note ....
Id. at 17-18.
180 See, e.g., Household Sewing Mach. Co., No. 8761 (FTC Aug. 6, 1969); All-State
Ind. of N.C., Inc., No. 8788 (FTC Apr. 1, 1969).
131 Id.
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sumer. Assuming that the poor have a limited choice as to sources of
credit, and that they are at a psychological and financial disadvantage'32
vis-i-vis the seller, there is a question whether disclosure will cure the
basic problem, although it may ameliorate it. Furthermore, the Com-
mission found that low-income consumers have difficulty in asserting
their contractual rights. 133 In that context, the mere warning provided
by a disclosure remedy may be insufficient. Certainly, empirical data on
this point would be desirable. At any rate, the Commission could
examine future cases in the light of Keppel, in order to determine
whether the routine assignment of sales contracts to third parties, with
or without disclosure, is not inherently unfair when the practices are
directed at a segment of the population who may not fully comprehend
the legal significance of the warning, and if they do, may have no
meaningful alternative. 34 As Mr. Justice Brandeis stated in another
context, "a method of competition fair among equals may be very un-
fair if applied where there is inequality of resources."' 35
CONSUMER PROTECTION PRIORITIES IN THE CONTEXT
OF ANTITRUST CONSIDERATIONS
Confronted by unceasing and increasing demands for consumer
protection, the FTC's primary problem in the 1970's will be where
to direct its limited resources. This issue has been forcibly brought
to the Commission's attention by a number of recent studies which
have severely criticized the agency's allocation of resources and selec-
tion of cases in the consumer protection area. 36 The main complaint
centers on the allegation that lack of planning has diverted the Com-
mission's energies to cases of trivial import while fundamental prob-
lems are left unchallenged. 37 Although these studies have validly as-
sessed the need for new approaches in determining the Commission's
132 See note 128 supra.
133 Effective assertion of strictly contractual rights is severely curtailed by the
financial condition and educational level of a substantial number of unsophis-
ticated consumers who buy on such credit arrangements ....
Household Sewing Mach. Co., No. 8761 at 13 (FTC Aug. 6, 1969).
134 Public policy, in terms of the concept of fair business methods, may well be
moving in that direction. See Note, A Case Study of the Impact of Consumer Legislation,
The Elimination of Negotiability and the Cooling-Off Period, 78 YALE L.J. 618, 632 (1969).
A number of states have limited the applicability of the doctrine in consumer transactions.
See REPORT ON DxsTucT OF COLUMBIA CONSUMER PROTECTION PROGRAM, supra note 125,
at 18.
133 FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 438 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
136 See, e.g., REPORT OF THE ABA COMMaISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL TRAVn Comnaxs-
sION, supra note 29; Cox, Fellmeth & Schulz, The Consumer and the Federal Trade Com-
mission-A Critique of the Consumer Protection Record of the FTC, 115 CONG. REc. 370
(daily ed. Jan. 22, 1969).
137 This, of course, is not a new complaint in the FTC's experience. See note 42 supra.
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priorities, it is regrettable that such criticisms have to a considerable
degree, overlooked the many positive accomplishments of the agency.
It is also clear that the necessary improvements cannot rest solely on
a more efficient managerial structure or more elaborate planning staffs,
important as such remedies are. The Commission must also devise an
analytical framework in which the benefits of differing alternatives
and cases in the consumer protection area may be systematically as-
sessed.
Fundamental to such a reassessment is a recognition of the fact
that the Commission's direct consumer protection activities had their
origin in antitrust (which, in fact, is basic to consumer protection), and
that many problems of the consumer do stem from competitive imper-
fections. This has clear implications for a selection of priorities in the
area of the Commission's consumer protection responsibilities. Market
structure should be an important consideration in such an analysis,
for it determines the behavior of firms in an industry which in turn
determines the quality of the industry's performance.138 The Commis-
sion should give priority to consumer protection in those markets
where industry structure indicates that performance, because of in-
adequate competition, may be marred by deception, fraud or other
unfair trade practices, against which the consumer, having no real al-
ternative, may be defenseless. Thus, oligopoly theory may well provide
a significant analytical tool for recognizing important areas in which
the Commission's consumer protection efforts should be brought to
bear. The Supreme Court, from the early 1960's, has consistently af-
forded recognition to the problem of oligopoly power 39 in markets
dominated by a few sellers. A similar recognition, i.e., that economic
structure may serve to identify problem areas, is long overdue in the
field of consumer protection.
Economic theory postulates, and judicial opinion has accepted,
the thesis that competition in markets of few sellers differs significantly
from competition in markets comprised of many sellers.140 In the
oligopolistic market, the dominant sellers each have sufficient market
power to influence prices. As a result, each will determine his price and
138 R. CAVES, AMERICAN INDUSTRY: STRU1icruRE, CoNDuCr, PERrORMANcE 16 (1964). Struc-
tural analysis of antitrust has received increasing judicial support. See, e.g., FTC v. Proc-
ter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 592 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); United States v. Prov-
ident Nat'l Bank, 280 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
139 See Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts-From Eco-
nomic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. RV. 285 (1967).
140 Id. at 289. See also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 US. 271, 280
(1964).
[VOL. 44:597
UNFAIR METHODS OF COMPETITION
output in light of the anticipated actions of his rivals.141 The concept
of oligopolistic interdependence, therefore, postulates that it is in the
self-interest of sellers with similar cost factors to charge identical prices,
eventually arriving at an identical equilibrium price that will yield
the largest return.142 In short, competition in the concentrated market
is likely to emphasize nonprice competition while deemphasizing rivalry
in price.14 3 This emphasis on nonprice competition is especially likely
with respect to consumer goods; 144 and significantly, such nonprice
competition, emphasizing product differentiation, has had the ten-
dency to reduce the ability of consumers to make knowledgeable
choices among competing products.145 The implications for the Com-
mission's consumer protection activities are obvious.
Reliance on economic analysis which has been judicially accepted
in the antitrust field would also enable the Commission to pinpoint
those areas in which it would be appropriate under the FTCA to en-
courage the informative function of advertising.146 The establishment
of priorities for consumer protection could be greatly facilitated by
identifying those markets in which the emphasis is on nonprice com-
petitive strategies, as well as those industries in which competitive
strategies rely primarily on advertising to secure market shares from
rivals having identical products. 47
Recent consumer legislation such as the Fair Packaging and
Labeling Act 148 and the Truth in Lending Act 149 manifest concretely
the congressional realization that providing consumer information to
facilitate rational purchasing will further antitrust objectives. In this
connection, the Fair Packaging Act's declaration of policy expressly
notes that "informed consumers are essential to the fair and efficient
functioning of a free market economy." Similarly, the objectives of
the Truth in Lending Act include the enhancement of competition
141 J. BAIN, INDusrIAL ORGANIZATION 30 (1959).
142 Brodley, supra note 139, at 289.
143See Barnes, Considerations Concerning a Public Policy Toward Administered
Prices: A Compendium on Public Policy, SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG.,
lsr Sss. 44-45 (Comm. Print 1968).
144 Id. at 45.
145 Id.
146 See Alberty v. FTC, 182 F.2d 36, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (Bazelon, J., dissenting).
147 E.g., consider the bleach industry.
Since all liquid bleach is chemically identical, advertising and sales promotion
are vital.... These heavy expenditures [for advertising] went far to explain why
Clorox maintained so high a market share despite the fact that its brand, though
chemically indistinguishable from rival brands, retailed for a price equal to or,
in many instances, higher than its competitors.
FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 886 U.S. at 572.
148 80 Stat. 1296 (1966), 15 U.S.C. § 1451 (Supp. IV 1969).
149 82 Stat. 146 (1968), 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (Supp. IV 1969).
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among institutions engaged in the extension of credit.150 Consumer
information, in the view of Congress, may enhance the integrity of
markets by: (1) more accurately directing the productive activities of
the economy; (2) promoting effective competition by eliminating un-
fair practices; (3) assuring equality of opportunity for all efficient
producers and distributors by eliminating irrationality in the market;
(4) promoting effective price competition by minimizing consumer
confusion; (5) channeling profits to the most efficient producers. 151
Clearly, antitrust and those enforcement activities which may be de-
scribed as direct consumer protection are complementary, a fact which
must be recognized in any ordering of priorities in the consumer field.
Such analysis, however, is valid only for setting broad objectives and
identifying areas of particular concern. Having once selected, within
a particular market, unfair practices of sufficient public interest to
warrant intervention under the FTCA, the legality of the practice,
which must be considered in a specific proceeding, should be judged
by the tests of deception or capacity to deceive in light of previously
developed precedents. Once the priorities for consumer protection
have been determined, it would be self-defeating, as well as a circum-
vention of the express intent of Wheeler-Lea, to decide the question of
violation by balancing the possible stimulus to competition, provided
by confusing promotional claims which might benefit particular com-
petitors, against the consumer's right to know. 52 And in the broader
perspective, the Commission, under the mandate of the FTCA, is
undoubtedly the agency best suited to reconcile and complement con-
sumer protection and antitrust objectives.
A final caveat should be entered. While considerable improvement
in establishing the agency's priorities is undoubtedly desirable and
necessary, a search for a purely mechanical and abstract interpretation
of the Commission's mandate would be unrealistic. The individual
approaches to the duty of discovering and making explicit "those
unexpressed standards of fair dealing which the conscience of the
community may progressively develop"' 53 are, of necessity, unlikely to
150 It is noteworthy that S. 387, one of the earlier "Truth-in-Packaging" bills, was
introduced as an antitrust measure amending the Clayton Act. See STAFF OF SENATE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, 88TH CONG., 2o SEss., REPORT ON "TRUTH-IN-PACKAGINg" (Comm. Print
1964).
151 Id.
152 For a seemingly contrary view that certain Commission rulings in the anti-decep-
tion area have unduly restricted new competitors and products, see G. ALxANDEa, supra
note 28, at xiii.
153 FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 86 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1936), rev'd on other
grounds, 502 U.S. 112 (1937).
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be unanimous. Here, the last word may be left to Commissioner
Thompson, who described the evolution of the concept of "unfair
methods" as follows:
The history of the Federal Trade Commission is the story of the
unfolding of a procedure and enforcement thereunder within the
framework of an Act which gave extraordinary latitude to men
who were just as human and normal as beings should be. Hence
the wave-like advancement and recession in interpretation and
enforcement of the Act."' 54
154 Thompson, supra note 39, at 261.
